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Abstract 
As the first global carbon fund, the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) aims to 
catalyze the market for project-based greenhouse gas emission reductions while 
promoting sustainable development and offering a learning-by-doing opportunity to its 
stakeholders. Since the inception in 1999, the PCF has engaged in a dialogue with China 
to get it to sign up as a host country, because the World Bank and other international and 
bilateral donors expect great potential of the clean development mechanism (CDM) in 
China and feel the significant need for building CDM capacity in China to enable it to 
gain more insight into the CDM and increase its capacity to initiate and undertake CDM 
projects. This paper first discusses why China had hesitated to sign up as a host country 
of PCF projects until September 2003. Then the paper explains what has led China to 
endorse the PCF projects. The paper ends with discussions on the implications of the 
PCF’s offering prices for the emerging global carbon market. 
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1. Introduction 
In recognition of the potential impacts of climate change on its borrowing client countries, 
the World Bank has been participating in the climate change process since its beginning. 
This, combined with the limited existing capacity in developing countries and in 
economies in transition in originating CDM and joint implementation (JI) projects, led 
the World Bank to undertake a pioneering role in developing the market for greenhouse 
gas emission reductions through the establishment of the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF, 
2003).2 As the first global carbon fund, the PCF aimed to: 
• demonstrate how project-based transactions in greenhouse gas emission 
reductions can contribute to the sustainable development of developing countries 
and countries with economies in transition; 
• share the knowledge gained in the course of the PCF’s operations with all 
interested parties; and 
• demonstrate how the World Bank can work in partnership with the public and 
private sectors to mobilize new resources for its borrowing member countries 
while addressing global environmental concerns.3 
 
                                                 
2 The World Bank’s engagement in carbon finance started with the establishment of the 
US$180 million Prototype Carbon Fund in 1999. Since then the Bank has also agreed to 
administer country carbon funds for the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Denmark. In 
addition the Bank established the Community Development Carbon Fund and the 
BioCarbon Fund in 2003. The Bank administered carbon funds grew from US$413.6 
million in July 2004 to about US$914.7 million in July 2005 (“New Carbon Finance 
Strategy Increases Opportunities For Developing Countries”, Press Release, 6 December 
2005, The World Bank (the carbon finance business web site at: 
http://carbonfinance.org)). 
3 See the PCF web site at http://carbonfinance.org. 
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The PCF operates like a mutual fund, pooling the collective resources from 23 investors 
(6 governments and 17 companies) and investing these funds in projects that reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions or remove these emissions from the atmosphere and that would 
in many cases not be financially viable without financial support from the PCF. The PCF 
is not legally able to own these carbon credits generated from the PCF projects. These 
credits have to go back to those investors pro rata according to their level of investment 
in the Fund. Participants in the Fund agreed on a set of project selection and portfolio 
development criteria designed to serve the “learning-by-doing” objective of the PCF 
while reducing project risk through portfolio diversity. In practice, these objectives are 
achieved by balancing the Fund’s portfolio between: CDM and JI;4 geographic regions; 
and eligible sectors and technologies and/or fuel switching in projects that create 
emissions reductions additional to a credible baseline of what would have happened 
without the CDM/JI project. 
 
The World Bank and other international and bilateral donors are keen to support CDM 
capacity building in China because they expect great potential of the CDM in China and 
feel the significant need for China to gain more insight into the CDM and increase its 
capacity to initiate and undertake CDM projects. Thus, since the inception, the PCF has 
engaged in a dialogue with China to get it to sign up as a host country. This paper first 
discusses why China had hesitated to sign up as a host country of PCF projects until 
September 2003. Then the paper explains what has led China to endorse the PCF projects 
                                                 
4 In February 2001, the PCF decided that it would seek a ratio of 3 to 2 between CDM 
and JI projects in the portfolio (PCF, 2003). 
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in the end. The paper ends with discussions on the implications of the PCF’s offering 
prices for the emerging global carbon market. 
 
2. Why had China hesitated to sign up as a host country? 
With the already huge and growing amount of greenhouse gas emissions and a great deal 
of low-cost abatement options available, many economic modelling studies indicate that 
China is widely regarded as the world’s number one host country of CDM projects. For 
instance, the studies of Zhang (1999, 2000, 2001, 2004) show that about 60% of the total 
CDM flows in 2010 go to China. The similar findings are also founded in the World 
Bank-led study on the CDM market potential, the results of which suggest that China will 
capture about 50% of the world’s CDM market in 2010 (World Bank, 2004). But, making 
this potential a reality represents a significant challenge for China, because there has been 
a general lack of awareness by both the Chinese government and business communities, 
institutional structure, and implementation strategy. This has raised great concern about 
China’s ability to compete internationally for CDM projects and exploit fully the 
potential. The World Bank and other international and bilateral donors feel the significant 
need for CDM capacity building in China to enable it to gain more insight into the CDM 
and increase its capacity to initiate and undertake CDM projects. For this, since the 
inception, the PCF has engaged in a dialogue with China to get it to sign up as a host 
country. The PCF experience suggests that completing the first carbon deal in a host 
country is a powerful capacity building tool, with tremendous impact on supply on its 
own (Lecocq, 2003). But China had hesitated to sign up the PCF until late 2003. There 
are several reasons. First, rules governing the CDM are not agreed on among parties to 
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the Kyoto Protocol until the seventh Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and as a very important player, 
China does not want to see that its involvement in the PCF leads the rules operating the 
PCF to have any impacts on overall rule-setting for the Kyoto mechanisms. Second, 
China considers the PCF’s targeted price levels of about US$ 3.3 per ton of CO2-
equivalent too low,5 relative to its expectation of US$ 10 per ton of CO2-equivalent or 
more.6 Understandably, the investors in the PCF exert pressure to keep the purchasing 
prices low. Other host countries of the PCF projects are not in a strong position to 
negotiate with investors to increase the PCF’s price levels. China is the only country that 
seriously regards the PCF’s price levels as too low, and views that the low price levels 
will affect the sustainability and expansion of the PCF over the long run.7  Third, the PCF 
establishes a practice where the host country takes the risk in case a project does not 
perform as planned (In general, PCF transactions are structured so that the project 
sponsors and their creditors assume most project risks, while the PCF bears most of the 
Kyoto Protocol-related risks (PCF, 2003). So the PCF takes the registration risk and 
                                                 
5 Minimum requirements for PCF projects specify that estimated cost of emission 
reductions should preferably be less than US$ 10 per ton of carbon, which is equivalent 
to about US$ 3 per ton of CO2-equivalent (see the PCF web site at 
http://carbonfinance.org). 
6 Author’ interviews in Beijing, January 2004. A study coordinated by Stanford 
University’s Energy Modeling Form examined the cost of meeting the Kyoto 
commitments according to a dozen different global energy-economy models. The results 
from these models show the world carbon price of double-digit number (Weyant and Hill, 
1999). This may be the basis of China’s expectation for high price of carbon credit. 
However, these estimates are made when the U.S. is part of the Protocol. The point is that, 
the U.S. being the biggest single buyer on the international market of tradable permits, its 
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol breaks the balance of the buyers and sellers on the 
international permit market. The studies focusing on the implications of the U.S. 
withdrawal from the Protocol (e.g., Löschel and Zhang, 2002) show that the U.S. non-
ratification leads to a sharp drop in the price of permits on the international market. 
7 Author’ interviews in Beijing, January 2004.  
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continues to purchase VERs even if the project itself eventually fails to get registered 
under the Kyoto Protocol. By contrast, most buyers purchase certified emission 
reductions (CERs), thus passing on the registration risk to the seller. In this case, because 
the seller is more exposed to project risk, it thus comes as no surprise that CERs, on 
average, have been traded at a higher price than VERs. The carbon market study by 
Lecocq and Capoor ( 2005) found that, CERs have been traded between US$ 3.00 and 
US$ 7.15 per ton of CO2-equivalent between January 2004 and April 2005, with a 
weighted average of US$ 5.63, in comparison with the VERs’ price that ranges from US$ 
3.60 to US$ 5.15 over the same period and has a weighted average of US$ 4.23 (see 
Figure 1). Because JI projects in the Eastern European countries pose a comparably less 
risk for the buyer than CDM projects in developing countries, the corresponding emission 
reduction units (ERUs) are sold at slightly higher prices, ranging from US$ 4.57 to US$ 
7.20 and with a weighted average of US$ 6.04.), and China does not accept that the PCF 
projects do not bear some risks in implementation and crediting, although the PCF 
guarantees payment on delivery of the verified emission reductions (VERs).8 Fourth, 
there are some concerns about the formal status of PCF projects regarding whether they 
can eventually be recognized as CDM projects. To be recognized as CDM projects, the 
baseline methodologies of the PCF projects have to be approved by the CDM Executive 
Board (EB). At the time of the PCF dialoguing with China to get it to sign up as a host 
country, the CDM EB approved a total of nine baseline methodologies. The PCF 
                                                 
8 The risk of non-delivery for the PCF, a carbon buyer, is mitigated by purchasing VERs 
on delivery rather than upfront. Although a project developer is able to use this carbon 
purchase agreement as a collateral to leverage financing that would otherwise not have 
been available, the host country and business’s risks associated with the underlying 
project remain, unless the carbon buyer is able to share these risks with the project 
developer (Lecocq, 2003).  
 7
submitted the eight methodologies for its own projects, but only got the two 
methodologies approved (JIQ, 2004). At that time, it was difficult to predict which 
portion of the PCF portfolio would eventually be covered by approved methodologies. 
But the bottom line is that as more methodologies get approved, the regulatory 
uncertainty regarding the status of the PCF projects will further diminish. By December 
2004, approximately 60% of the PCF portfolio was covered by approved or nearly 
approved methodologies (Ringius, 2005).9
 
Figure 1  Prices of project-based carbon credits 
Source: Drawn based on data from Lecocq and Capoor (2005). 
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9 The CDM EB has to date approved the 23 baseline methodologies (JIQ, 2005). 
However, it should be pointed out that not every project developer needs to propose a 
new methodology to the EB for consideration and approval. A project developer is free to 
opt for using a methodology previously approved by the EB, if appropriate. 
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Figure 2  Status of project development in the PCF 
Source: PCF (2004). 
 
 
3. What led China to endorse the PCF projects? 
Despite the difference in opinion, negotiations between the PCF and China have never 
stopped. On 16 September 2003, two sides made important progress in negotiations in 
Beijing, and China decided to be a host country of the PCF.10 At this moment, there are 
several PCF projects in China under preparation, and the PCF has signed the Emission 
Reductions Purchase Agreement (ERPA)11 with the local project developers of the two 
projects: one on coal bed methane capture and power generation in Shanxi Province, and 
another on run-of-river hydropower to displace coal-fired power in Gansu Province.12 
                                                 
10 Personal communication with Lu Xuedu, The Chinese Ministry of Science and 
Technology, 3 July 2004. 
11 This agreement governs the purchases and sales of emission reductions (PCF, 2003). 
As indicated in Figure 2, four years into the placement phase, the PCF has reviewed over 
490 project idea notes, but only signed 16 ERPAs with a total value of US$ 74.3 million 
(PCF, 2004).  
12 The information cited below on the PCF funding contributions and the received 
amounts of emissions reductions for these two PCF projects is taken from the PCF web 
site at: http://carbonfinance.org (accessed on 27 July 2005). 
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The coal bed methane project is the first World Bank-supported CDM project in China. 
As one of the investors, the PCF contributes US$ 17 million in return of 4 million tons of 
CO2-equivalent of the total project’s emissions reduction of 49 million tons of CO2-
equivalent. This is the first project in China that the PCF has signed the ERPA with the 
local project developer. For the Xiaogushan hydropower project, the PCF invests US$ 
9.22 million and receives the emissions reduction of 2.17 million tons of CO2-equivalent 
of the total project’s emissions reduction of 2.93 million tons of CO2-equivalent during 
the crediting period of 10 years. Signed on July 14, 2005 in Beijing, the ERPA for the 
Xiaogushan project is the first carbon finance hydropower project in East Asia, and the 
second agreement of this kind in China.13 Based on the PCF funding contributions and 
the received amounts of emissions reduction of CO2-equivalent, the purchasing prices of 
emissions reductions for these two PCF projects are set through negotiation at US$ 4.25 
per ton of CO2-equivalent.14 As indicated in Table 1, this is the highest purchasing price 
that the PCF paid for the VERs until the end of the year 2004.  
                                                 
13 “China to Reduce Three Million Tons of Greenhouse Gases with Renewable Energy 
Project”, Press Release No. 2006/027/ESSD, 14 July 2005, The World Bank (the PCF 
web site at: http://carbonfinance.org). 
14 The PCF has signed an umbrella agreement with the Chinese government on the 
purchases of 20 millions of CO2-equivalent at the price of US$ 4.25 per ton of CO2-
equivalent. But for each PCF project, a fixed price needs to be agreed through the 
negotiations between the PCF and the specific project developers. This way to share the 
price risk provides incentives for both parties to perform. Some PCF contracts provide 
the project developers the opportunity to sell a fixed volume of the annual emissions 
reductions, which are generated above the amount due to the PCF, to a third party (PCF, 
2003). Alternatively, under the Dutch CERUPT (Certified Emission Reduction Unit 
Procurement Tender) program, the contractor must offer the surplus of generated CERs 
to Senter (the tendering authority for the CERUPT) at the market price of the CERs at the 
time of delivery before it can do so to any other party, although Senter is in no way 
obligated to purchase more CERs than are agreed upon in the contract (Senter 
Internationaal, 2001).  
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Table 1  Changing contract prices for the World Bank-managed funds (US$ per ton 
of CO2-equivalent) 
 
Year Maximum price paid by the 
PCF/other large project funds 
Maximum price paid by the 
Community Development Carbon 
Fund 
2003 
2004 
2005 to date 
3.75 
4.25 
5.00 
 
5.00 
5.50 
 
Source: Newcombe (2005). 
 
What led the PCF to reach a watershed agreement with China that leads it to endorse the 
PCF projects? First, it is related to the time table set for the funds reserved for projects in 
China. The Fund’s maximum size is capped at US$ 180 million. At the creation of the 
PCF, its Participants Committee has requested to reserve US$ 18 million, 10% of the 
Fund’s capital base, for potential projects in China.15 But these funds are only able to be 
reserved by the end of 2003. While China still views that the PCF projects do bear some 
risks in implementation and crediting, such perceived risks are not at unreasonable levels 
because the PCF guarantees payment on delivery of the VERs. 
 
Another reason is related to weak demand for CERs, which makes it much hard for China 
to negotiate with the PCF on the price. It is conceivable that China’s side is keen to 
ensure that the carbon credits from China have a high value. However, as shown in Table 
2 indicating the prevailing price levels for CDM projects at less than US$ 6 per ton of 
CO2-equivalent at the time of the PCF dialoguing with China to get it to sign up as a host 
                                                 
15 The spending ceiling set for China is not fixed. In case the World Bank were unable to 
use the amount of the funds originally allocated to other regions, it could invest the 
remaining in China (Personal communication with Lu Xuedu, The Chinese Ministry of 
Science and Technology, 23 September 2005). Indeed, investing US$ 26.22 million in the 
aforementioned two projects in China, the PCF already shots that ceiling. 
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country, the development of the carbon market just turns the price of carbon credits the 
other way around, and leaves China a very little space to influence the market.16
  
Table 2  Prices of carbon credits under the selected programs 
Programs Price of carbon credits (US$ per ton of 
CO2-equivalent) 
World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund 
Dutch CERUPT program 
Dutch-IFC CDM Facility 
Dutch-IBRD CDM Facility 
3 - 4 
4.4 - 5.5* 
~ 4 
~ 4 
 
* € 4-5 per ton of CO2-equivalent. 
Source: Zhang (2004). 
 
Third, China hopes to use those projects on the margin to gain much-needed, real 
learning. Recongnising that it is hard to change the situation in weak demand in the short 
run, China thought that it is whorthwhile undertaking some PCF projects, in particular 
those PCF projects that fall into the priority area under the CDM in China (The Chinese 
government has prioritized the areas of the CDM investment. The priority areas for CDM 
projects in China are energy efficiency improvement, development and utilization of new 
and renewable energy, and methane recovery and utilization.) and whose local developers 
are determined to undertake these projects and need the funding on the margin. In this 
case, the funding from the PCF is considered additional. Undertaking these projects will 
provide much-needed, real learning and practice about baseline setting, project 
boundaries, monitoring and verification at project levels, these aspects that are most 
relevant to all prospective projects under the CDM but in which China has gained little 
                                                 
16 On the other hand, China is fully aware of its role as a dominated suppler of CERs. 
Whatever prices are set for China projects will have impacts on the world prices. Thus, 
China is not to give up the price issue so easily. 
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experience in the AIJ (Activities Implemented Jointly) pilot phase. The different attitudes 
towards the AIJ pilot phase among the Chinese ministries concerned at the beginning put 
China at the slow starter of AIJ projects. As a result, China has only hosted 5 AIJ projects, 
with 4 projects registered with the UNFCCC Secretariat (see Table 3). For all these 
projects, there have been quite tough bilateral negotiations between China and the 
investor countries. The estimated unit costs of abatement for these registered projects are 
very high. 
 
Table 3  The registered AIJ projects in China 
 
Project Typea Parties 
involved 
(host/investor) 
Lifetime 
(years) 
Emissions 
reductions per 
year (tons of 
CO2-equivalent) 
Estimated unit 
abatement cost 
(US$ per 
avoided ton of 
CO2-
equivalent)  
A. Installation of a 
coke dry-quenching 
facility 
B. Model project for 
energy conservation 
in electric furnace 
used for ferro-alloy 
refining 
C. CFBC & CHP 
project in Shangqiu 
thermal power plant 
in Henan Province of 
China 
D. Model project for 
utilization of waste 
heat from 
incineration of refuse 
in Harbin of China 
Energy 
efficiency 
 
Energy 
efficiency 
 
 
 
Energy 
efficiency 
 
 
 
Fugitive 
gas capture 
 
China/Japan 
 
 
China/Japan 
 
 
 
 
China/Norway 
 
 
 
 
China/Japan 
20 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
20 
68265 
 
 
29050 
 
 
 
 
87480 
 
 
 
 
62896 
19.6 
 
 
22.6 
 
 
 
 
15.0 
 
 
 
 
31.1 
 
a The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has classified type of AIJ project as energy 
efficiency; renewable energy; fuel switching; forest preservation, restoration or reforestation; 
afforestation; fugitive gas capture; industrial process; solvents; agriculture; waste disposal; or 
bunker fuels. 
Source: Zhang (2004). 
 
 13
4. The implications of the PCF’s offering prices 
When applauding this positive development in the PCF, we have to realize that host 
countries like China are very concerned about the price issue. In the early stage of the 
carbon market, the World Bank and the Dutch government are the two most active 
players on the buyer side in project-based transactions. In volume terms, they represent 
30% and 26% of the carbon market in 2002-2003, respectively, as shown in Figure 3. 
This Figure also shows that the share of Japan in the carbon market increased from 6% in 
2001-2002 to 23% in 2002-2003. But unlike the Netherlands, Japan’s purchases are 
mainly from private entities.  
 
Figure 3  Market buyers (share of volume of emissions reductions purchased) 
Source: Lecocq and Capoor (2003). 
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At the time of the PCF dialoguing with China to get it to sign up as a host country, the 
maximum purchasing price that the PCF paid for the VERs was US$ 3.75 per ton of CO2-
equivalent (see Table 1). This is very much in the price range of US$ 3.5-4.0 per ton of 
CO2-equivalent, which was set in 1999 at the creation of the PCF.17 The Dutch CERUPT 
program is aiming at price levels of about US$ 5 per ton of CO2-equivalent. The offering 
price of the PCF is not intended to serve as the market price. Given its dominated role on 
the buyer side in the early stage of the carbon market, however, it will largely in practice 
set the standard for the carbon market. Private investors are unlikely to accept projects 
with a higher cost. To avoid harming their negotiation positions either in subsequent 
deals or in negotiating with the government on the emissions target and policy, private 
players often keep key elements of their deals such as prices or contract features 
confidential. However, given the fact that the publicly disclosed offering prices of PCF 
projects provide information on abatement costs in both economies in transition and in 
developing countries, it is conceivable that private players are unwilling to go beyond this 
price bound. This raises a very important question of striking the balance between 
encouraging investors to engage CDM projects (thus increasing the volume of CERs of 
CDM projects) and ensuring the quality of CERs. If the unit cost of abatement is so high, 
potential investors are scared away. Without CDM investment, there is no delivery of 
CERs. On the other hand, government and multinational actors had totally dominated on 
the demand side for CDM projects before the Kyoto Protocol entered into force. They 
continue to be the major buyers in the Kyoto market, at least so far, in the face of 
                                                 
17 Cited in the Report of the Asia Meeting on Efficient Clean Development Mechanism 
Operations, organised by the UNDP and the World Bank, 1-3 April 2003, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia. 
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continuous regulatory uncertainties. Moreover, they have greater flexibility than the 
private sector in determining the types of CERs that they are willing to purchase. Thus, if 
they are just interested in getting cheap CERs, there will be no strong incentives to 
encourage potential investors to develop CDM projects, in particular those sustainable 
projects like renewable energy projects. No doubt, the additional cash flow from CDM 
credits can boost the internal rate of return. But, the aforementioned World Bank-led 
study on the CDM market potential found that this added value from the current low 
price of CERs is insufficient to cover the incremental costs of implementing many CDM 
projects in China (World Bank, 2004). Put another way, the corresponding stream of 
CERs will be rarely the decisive factor that makes the most significant difference and 
renders these projects viable. This, combined with the lead times required for CDM 
projects and the current highly debatable process to review and approve CDM projects by 
the CDM Executive Board, raises both the concerns about China’s ability to fully 
capitalize on its CDM potential and the uncertainty over whether there will be sufficient 
amount of CDM credits available for meeting the demand from the EU and other Kyoto-
constrained parties before 2012. At the current low prices, a clear and understandable 
preference is to highly potent source of emissions, such as HFC23.18 This has been 
confirmed by the World Bank study. As shown in Figure 4, HFC23 decomposition 
project dominates among all project types, providing about 25% of the worldwide 
emission reductions supplied from January 2004 to April 2005. This will simply exclude 
                                                 
18 HFC23 is a by-product of the production of HFC22, which is used as a refrigerant and 
a raw material for the production of fluorinated resins. HFC23 is a very potent 
greenhouse gas. Its 100-year global warming potential is 12, 000 times that of CO2, 
implying that releasing one ton of HFC23 in the atmosphere is equivalent to 12, 000 tons 
of CO2 emissions. 
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a whole range of other CDM projects. All this clearly suggests that having the 
appropriate price level of CERs is critical for the development of CDM market, because, 
in the long run, the price of CERs, either too high or too low, would severely hamper the 
development of the market.  
 
Figure 4  Technology share of emission reduction projects 2003 – April 2005 (in 
percentage of total volume contracted) 
Source: Lecocq and Capoor (2005). 
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Table 4  The maximum offering prices of CERs under the Dutch CERUPT program 
CDM project type Maximum offering prices of CERs under 
the Dutch CERUPT program (€ per ton of 
CO2-equivalent) 
Renewable energy (excluding biomass) 
Biomass energy (excluding waste) 
Energy efficiency improvement 
Fossil fuel switch and methane recovery 
5.5 
4.4 
4.4 
3.3 
 
Source: Senter Internationaal (2001). 
 
 
From the preceding discussion, it thus follows that, to promote the sustainability and 
expansion of the World Bank’s carbon finance initiatives (including the PCF) as an 
integral part of the Bank’s mission to reduce poverty, mobilize resources for carbon 
financing, and to build the global carbon market over the long run, China and the World 
Bank should work together on the price issue. It is in their interests. The World Bank is 
there to promote and demonstrate how the market can work and to help catalyze the 
carbon market. However, the current, low price levels of CERs would have led its 
borrowing clients either to spend too much time on negotiations on this or to approve few 
CDM project proposals than what would otherwise have been the case. Thus, the Bank 
has an obligation to react to this concern of its borrowing clients as well as that of its 
lending clients. In the meantime, chairing the Host Country Committee of the World 
Bank’s Carbon Finance Business (CFB),19 China is now able to play an even more 
proactive role in either pushing for the various carbon funds managed by the CFB to pay 
                                                 
19 A host country of the PCF projects is entitled to be a member of the Host Country 
Committee if it has signed a memorandum of understanding or a letter of endorsement (or 
at least a letter of no objection) with the World Bank. Membership of the Host Country 
Committee has grown from less than 15 in the first year of PCF operations (PCF, 2003) 
to over 50 now. 
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a more favourable price20 or demanding that the offering prices are differentiated 
according to technology types. Indeed, as shown in Table 4, the offering prices of CERs 
under the Dutch CERUPT program are differentiated according to technology types, with 
renewable energy projects in general assigned with a premium price. This will broaden 
project types that carbon finance renders viable (Indeed, this has increased the number of 
renewable energy projects in the Dutch CERUPT portfolio to 75%). After all, the 
transactions of the PCF and other carbon funds managed by the CFB, although they are 
significant in comparison with the current carbon market, account for only a small 
portion of the total projected emissions reductions required for Annex I countries to meet 
their Kyoto targets. Much work remains ahead to stimulate both demand and supply so as 
to progressively scale up project-based carbon transactions and create the necessary 
liquidity in the global carbon market. 
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